Since becoming Prime Minister Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani In October 2022, the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of predominantly Shiite militias, is being revived, given official status as an auxiliary branch of the Iraqi security forces. Despite many challenges and serious setbacks since 2018, the PMF has demonstrated a remarkable ability to bounce back from weakened leadership and internal rifts, significant electoral defeats, and the loss of political capital among large sections of the Iraqi people. I’ve shown it. It has withstood pressures such as; U.S. Assassination in January 2020 former commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and his Iranian patron Qasem Soleimani, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force; Measures taken By former Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi. Not only has the PMF proven to be resilient, it also holds political and military advantages that could make it a force to be reckoned with for decades to come.
But the PMF also faces challenges, and its malign activities, including human rights abuses, can still be curbed, especially if Western countries and their regional allies can work with Iraqi moderates and those concerned about the group’s monopoly on power. there is a possibility. The PMF’s most serious difficulties come in the form of political conflicts within Iraq’s Shiite sect. The power and vulnerability of the PMF was revealed when Iraq was cornered last August. On the brink of civil war Following political tensions and violent confrontations between the PMF and its political allies (known as the Shi’ite Coordination Framework) and its rival Muqtada al-Sadr. Al-Sadr heads the Sadrist movement, Iraq’s most powerful socio-political movement, and Saraya al-Salam, one of the country’s most powerful militias. Although al-Sadr’s withdrawal from politics is expected to be temporary, al-Sadr will continue to be an important issue for the PMF in future disputes over the succession of religious leaders, economic turf wars, and daily political activities. right. This internal Shia conflict and external pressure not only threatens the PMF, but also threatens to reignite further violence and even civil war.
Rise and weakness of PMF
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Shiite militias have expanded their influence, increased their fighting capabilities, and dramatically transitioned from a patchwork of militias to powerful political actors with significant control over the Iraqi state. has achieved great success. Some, like the Badr Brigades, founded in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war, have already become established political actors with loyal support bases.Others, e.g. Asaib Al Al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollahdesignated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Attracted success on the battlefield It worked against the Islamic State (ISIS) from 2014 to 2018 and grew to become a major political player.
Iraq’s Shiite militia networks are supported by a series of informal sociopolitical, cultural, and security structures. Some emerged during the chaos following the invasion, while others developed during the Ba’athist rule. The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war fostered friendships, kinship, and revolutionary comradeship between major factions and their leaders.
This network is also supported by Iran. As head of the PMF and Kataib Hezbollah, and as Soleimani’s right-hand man, Muhandis has played a key role in increasing Iran’s influence over Iraq’s political system. As a result, Iran has in recent years outsourced some of its local security requirements to Muhandis, much as it did with Badr Brigades leader Hadi al-Amiri in the 1990s and after the 2003 US invasion. We were able to.
In the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections, a party associated with the PMF came in second place. This remarkable achievement solidified the PMF’s status as a formidable political actor. However, the assassinations of Muhandis and Soleimani in January 2020 further widened the internal rift. The PMF’s new leadership lacks authority and strategic acumen. Instead, major PMF groups such as the Badr Brigades and Asaib al-Al-Haq Nouri Al Maliki A member of the Islamic Dawa Party, his tenure as prime minister (2006-2014) hastened his elevation to the PMF.
Additionally, in March 2020, several PMF factions aligned with Iraq’s Ali al-Sistani. Withdrew from PMF It placed itself under the direct supervision of the Iraqi military. These militias previously resisted Iranian influence, but operated within the PMF during the war against ISIS. This split has significantly weakened the PMF, which had drawn much religious orthodoxy and political influence under the cover of Iraqi nationalism and patriotism, blessed by President al-Sistani in 2014. However, the PMF’s legitimacy had already been undermined by Iran’s actions in 2018. During the Tishreen protests, which challenged Iraq’s ruling elite, its misgovernment, and Iranian influence in the country, pro-Iraqi forces systematically repressed civilians.
This cumulative weakness was also exposed in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections, along with al-Sadr’s electoral acumen and dominance. 47 earned in 2018. The organization’s defeat contrasted with the success of its arch-rivals, the Sadrists. Who won 73 seats? (up from 54 wins in 2018).
PMF comeback
In the months that followed, al-Sadr tried to form a coalition majority in Iraq’s parliament at the expense of the PMF and the Shiite Coordination Framework, but their poor performance in the elections gave al-Sadr an opportunity to remove them from the government. I got it. But al-Sadr’s decision departed from the power-sharing agreement that has underlined the relationship between Iraq’s most powerful political party and its fiercest rival. This intensified internal Shiite conflict, which eventually exploded in riots in August 2022, resulting in casualties on both sides. As a result, al-Sadr decided to give up his hopes of forming a majority and withdrew (perhaps temporarily) from Iraq’s political struggle. This miscalculation paved the way for Mohamed Shia al-Sudani, Maliki’s deputy and Dawa strongman, to be appointed prime minister in October.
This political achievement was a boon for the PMF. The organization is further entrenched in the Iraqi state, expanding its economic capacity, diversifying its sources of income, and expanding its patronage network. Sudani in November 2022 Creation approved It is part of the PMF trading company called al-Muhandis (after the slain PMF commander of the same name), a state-sanctioned entity with an operating budget of at least $67 million.
But PMF also faces challenges.
despite him withdrawal From the perspective of Iraqi politics, Sadr is not going anywhere. As the heir to the political and religious leadership of his father, Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr, who was controversially called a marja in the 1990s, his younger brother al-Sadr still believes that he is the legitimate leader of Iraqi politics. and the religious Shia community. Al-Sadr’s limited religious credentials do not give him sufficient religious credibility to succeed Sistani, but he has the support of Iraq’s 2 million to 3 million Shiites. This gives him ample sociopolitical base to challenge Iraq’s post-Sistani political order. This upcoming religious succession struggle will intensify the conflict between al-Sadr and the PMF and its political ally, the Islamic Dawa Party.
These intra-Shiite political conflicts could become increasingly violent. The violence in August 2022 may unfortunately be a foreshadowing of what will happen to Iraq.collision caused at least 23 deaths The country was once again on the brink of civil war, and more people were injured.Significant mediation between Iraqi clerical organizations and the government in Najaf Hassan Nasrallah, a Lebanese Shiite cleric who heads Hezbollah, pulled Iraq back from the abyss. However, tensions between Asaib al-Alhaq and al-Sadr remain very high. Especially in Basra, which is rich in oil.. The city’s many resources provide an important economic base for both organizations and constitute an important strategic hub for their illicit commercial activities. conflict over resources It could be deadly again.
Apart from intra-Shiite political conflicts, Iraq also suffers from broader regional hostilities that can turn violent within its territory. That includes tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are grappling with an ongoing insurgency.Since the unrest spread, Iran has launched an attack They attacked Iranian rebel bases believed to be in Iraqi Kurdistan, and as part of that attack, they attacked targets in the North and South. shadow war Along with Israel and the United States. If tensions escalate further, Iraq could be drawn into a regional conflagration, which al-Sadr and the PMF could take advantage of. At home, the socio-economic grievances of Iraqis remain vast, and Sudan will struggle to address them. The revived Tishreen protests could once again be weaponized by al-Sadr al-Sadr and the PMF, sparking renewed conflict between them.
Therefore, the calm since Mr. Sudani took office is likely to be a deception. If violence reigns in Iraq again, the PMF is likely to gain the upper hand. Moreover, the fact that the PMF is deeply embedded in the Iraqi state makes it difficult to manage and leaves traditional Western state-building practices ill-suited to address the Iraqi state’s multifaceted challenges. Western powers and their allies must instead rely on empowering Iraqi political actors who want to address the PMF’s human rights abuses and efforts to monopolize power with guidance and support from Iran. To unite and fight back against the PMF, we must first address internal divisions over Iraq’s future and reconcile differences over power sharing and how the country’s wealth should be managed.
