Since the Chinese Communist Army expelled Kuomintang troops from mainland China to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the ability of the United States and its allies to monitor developments in mainland China has been greatly reduced. However, because of the importance and potential of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its close alliance with the Soviet Union, Washington and Langley considered it “critically important” to keep an eye on events there. Given this situation, reconnaissance aircraft were the best, and sometimes only, means of obtaining the reliable information the United States sought. Therefore, it can be concluded that the reasons for Chinese air reconnaissance were essentially the same as those for overflights of the Soviet Union.
As Krzysztof Dombrovski explained in his book Hunt for the U-2Before long, the skies of the People’s Republic of China were filled with uninvited aerial “visitors,” from Royal Air Force Spitfires taking off from Hong Kong to the diverse range of transport and reconnaissance aircraft that would become the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF). began to visit frequently. These flights typically departed from Peshawar airfield in northern Pakistan. Naturally, the Chinese military sensed the intrusion and took measures against the intruders, but although they regularly succeeded in low-level night flights by slow ROCAF aircraft, they were unable to intercept high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. experienced serious problems. On February 18, 1958, an RB-57A operated by the Taiwanese military was killed by two People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) interceptors, either MiG-15bis or MiG-17F, over Shandong. At an early stage, it was not surprising that the Chinese military could not effectively fight such targets. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the air force of Communist China in particular, as well as the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), was almost exclusively equipped with the same Soviet-made fighter interceptors, such as the MiG-15 and MiG-17. Capturing a CIA U-2 flying over Eastern Europe. Thus, the high-altitude reconnaissance planes that the United States provided to the Taiwanese were initially found to be able to roam over mainland China with impunity.
The RB-57D was the first advanced version capable of high-altitude operations to be deployed to the ROCAF. After a number of pilots of No. 4 Squadron received flying training, in 1958 within the framework of his Rhyl program he was supplied with three similar aircraft by his CIA. Starting in early 1959, these aircraft began penetrating deep into Chinese airspace. Above 20,000 meters (65,616 feet) above sea level. Not surprisingly, they quickly proved to be operating beyond the reach of PLAAF and PLAAF interceptors, not to mention traditional anti-aircraft guns. However, nothing lasts forever, and the Reds were trying to find a worthy answer to this problem. Communist leaders in Beijing requested assistance from Moscow. The Soviet Union responded quickly, delivering the first of a total of five SA-75 Dvina SAM systems and a training set along with 62 V-SAM systems in late 1958 and early 1959. 750 (1D) and V-750V (11D) missiles and all necessary support equipment.
The People’s Liberation Army’s 1st Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Battalion was declared operational on September 20, 1959, and was quickly followed by the 2nd Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Battalion. From the beginning, both units were operated entirely by the Chinese military, without any support from the Soviet military.
The People’s Liberation Army’s first two SAM units began operating in June 1959, when air raids by RB-57Ds of the People’s Republic of China Air Force 4th Squadron were over even Beijing. The PLA worked methodically and placed several SAM sites in the vicinity. of the Chinese capital to cover the routes most likely to be used by Taiwanese reconnaissance aircraft.
No matter how eager the PLA SAM operators were to prove their skills, nothing happened. No overflights were conducted in the two weeks since the aircraft was deployed outside Beijing. Indeed, during the most tense period of 1959, on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China from October 1 to 4, he believed that Taiwan was likely to launch a provocative air invasion. but nothing happened. There were no unwelcome “guests” from across the Strait of Formosa. Then, on the morning of October 5, 1959, an aircraft flying from the direction of Taiwan entered the airspace of the People’s Republic of China over Fujian Province. PLAAF radar tracked the intruders as they flew toward Nanjing, and interceptors were scrambled. However, the RB-57D was unable to intercept it as it was maintaining an altitude of 20,000-21,000 meters. Meanwhile, the airspace violator, Yangtze, came within about 500 kilometers of Beijing. For a time, it appeared that the time for the SAM sortie was near, but then the Taiwanese forces turned in the direction of Shanghai and flew away, never coming within range of the SA-75s. The Chinese were not only disappointed, but most of all they were very worried that their SAM had somehow been exposed. However, after careful consideration, they decided not to act rashly and wait for another opportunity. As subsequent events show, it turned out to be the right decision.
Two days later, on October 7, 1959, in an almost exact repeat of the previous event, Chinese radar operators detected a high-altitude aerial intruder. Due to the obvious importance of the unfolding events, efforts to counter airspace violators were coordinated by the People’s Liberation Army General Staff. Even though previous experience had shown that manned interceptors would not be able to acquire the RB-57D, the reconnaissance aircraft was ordered into the sky in the hope that it would malfunction or lose altitude due to malfunctions or other reasons. and began tracking him. Meanwhile, the intruder was indeed an RB-57D (ROCAF serial 5643, US fiscal year serial 53-3978), piloted by Captain Ying Ching Wong, continued in the direction of Beijing, this time not turning away. It soon became apparent that Taiwanese aircraft would be within range of the SAM, so manned interceptors were ordered to leave, clearing the air for the missiles.
The RB-57D was on course to be within range of the 2nd Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Battalion, commanded by Yue Zhenhua. When the distance approached 200 km, the order was received to destroy the reconnaissance plane. The battalion’s radar picked up the target from a range of 115 km, but the range rapidly decreased to 41 km, when Yue Zhenhua ordered a volley of three missiles. The first of his V-750s he took off at 12:04 and was quickly followed by two more aircraft. After about 40 seconds, the target was at a distance of 29-30 km and the first attack hit. The target changed course and began to rapidly lose altitude. After descending to an altitude of approximately 5,000 meters, it disappeared from the radar screen and was accurately determined to have “collapsed.” The destruction of the RB-57D was immediately reported to the PLA chain of command, and soon the General Staff arrived on the scene with the help of helicopters. The wreckage of the crashed aircraft was scattered over a radius of 5,000 to 6,000 meters and was identified as that of an RB-57D. In the collected debris he found as many as 2,471 debris holes, and it was not surprising that the reconnaissance plane was torn apart. Unfortunately, this accident was fatal for the Taiwanese pilot.
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Photo courtesy of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.
