The Department of Defense (DND) has revised its estimate for the lifetime cost of owning and operating the Air Force’s CH-148 Cyclone to $15.9 billion, an increase of just over $1 billion from the previous estimate.
CBC News last week reported internal documents for 2021 that show total lifecycle costs, including purchasing, operating and sustaining costs, are expected to exceed $14.87 billion.
CBC asked the bureau at the time for current numbers, but received only partial information. DND did not release updated cost projections until earlier this week.
The revised figures predict that maintenance and operating costs will increase over the period the aircraft is expected to remain in service for a decade and a half.
Although the acquisition of maritime helicopters has been in the works for 20 years, the Air Force has yet to receive the last two of the 28 aircraft it has ordered.
DND announced that it will receive its penultimate helicopter at the end of next month, and the last aircraft in 2025.
Defense Minister Bill Blair told CBC News that while he is “deeply troubled” by the increased costs, he has no plans to abandon the program and start looking for another aircraft to play a key role in anti-submarine warfare.
“The Air Force continues to report confidence in the Cyclone platform,” Blair said. “They’re still very committed to it.”
Still, the department is looking for an outside consultant to help chart a course for the troubled program launched in 2004 by the previous Liberal government.
A leaked internal report obtained by CBC News earlier this month says the Cyclone has not yet reached final operational status (a key designation that indicates the military has received compensation), but the fighter jet, data link , the communication system is shown to be incomplete. It is already outdated and needs to be replaced.
Critics blame much of the higher cost projections on the fact that the Cyclone is a so-called “orphan” helicopter with its own supply chain. Canada is the only country flying the CH-148.
DND disputed this claim, arguing that while the Cyclone supply chain is unique, these numbers are based on flight hours and spare parts and are not driving higher cost projections.
Prime Minister Blair said the costs of the cyclone remained manageable.
“My job is to keep asking questions, whether you like it or not.” [the program] “It’s still a good business case for Canadian taxpayers,” he said.
“If the military comes back and says this has become unmanageable because the cost is not acceptable, then we have to look at alternatives to replacement, but in some circumstances we may move to another platform. might be the right choice.”
Prime Minister Blair said the Pentagon was not at that point.
Retired Col. Larry McFah, an aviation expert who commanded the 423rd Squadron when it flew the CH-124 Sea Kings, believes it is highly unlikely that DND and the Air Force will abandon the program. said.
“I think they’re addicted to it,” said Makwa, a frequent critic of the Cyclone program.
“The bureaucracy in charge of this project is doing everything in its power to convince authorities and politicians that the aircraft it has purchased is viable.”
The Cyclone is based on the civilian helicopter S-92. The American manufacturer envisioned DND to be a relatively painless conversion when it was first proposed by Sikorsky.
The “worst procurement” in Canadian history?
That didn’t happen.
According to an internal DND report leaked in late 2021, Sikorsky had “limited experience with the scope and depth of in-service support required by Canada and limited knowledge of Canada’s airworthiness systems.” ”.
Sikorsky also incorrectly assumed a high level of commonality between the CH-148 and the civilian-certified S-92, and stated, “As a result, the company is using the military S-92A to meet Canadian requirements.” “We significantly underestimated the number of changes and tests needed to achieve this goal.” . ”
Planning delays and soaring costs led former Conservative defense minister Peter MacKay to describe the nearly 12-year-old Cyclone as “the worst procurement in Canadian history.”
However, the Conservative government at the time chose to re-contract Siklorski even after hiring its own external consultants.